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ABSTRACT 
 This article describes how a new policy – Arctic shipping corridors – can provide 
an adaptable framework for advancing marine law and policy in the Canadian Arctic. As 
the polar ice pack recedes due to climate change, vessel traffic in the region is increasing. 
As an initial response, the Canadian federal government has proposed a system of 
voluntary marine transportation corridors. Shipping corridors are a pragmatic policy 
solution that could be used to advance a number of priority maritime issues including: 
responsible economic development, human and vessel safety, environmental protection, 
and Inuit rights. Effective designation and management of shipping corridors requires a 
more integrated approach than exists now to account for the complexity of the Arctic 
marine environment. This paper explores how corridor design can create a national arctic 
shipping policy that advances (1) marine safety, (2) Inuit land claims agreements, (3) 
environmental protection, and (4) international cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Canadian Arctic Ocean remains one of the least travelled and most hazardous 
ocean zones in the world.1 However, melting sea ice is increasing the perception and 
reality that the Canadian Arctic is a viable navigation route.2  To date, there has been 
limited shipping activity in the Canadian Arctic; but, as sea ice recedes due to climate 
change providing a longer open-water shipping season, a new era of Arctic marine 
transportation is emerging.3 Predictions of ice-free summer months in the Arctic Ocean in 
the foreseeable future have fuelled speculation and exploratory interest over Arctic 
shipping routes for minerals, oil and gas, and other commercial goods. 4  
 This reality, however, is still decades away. Despite recent increases – the 
Canadian Coast Guard reports that Canadian Arctic waters have seen a 166% increase in 
voyages since 2004 – the total number of voyages is still relatively low compared to other 
global shipping zones.5 The Canadian government thus has lead-time to plan for and 
invest in strategic initiatives that foster an effective and sustainable Arctic-specific 
shipping policy for Canada. In particular, basic infrastructure, modern charting, 
emergency prevention and preparedness, environmental protections, and robust vessel 
management and monitoring are requisites to avoid a large-scale pollution or loss of life 
event.  
 The prospect of significant increases in transit or destination shipping presents a 
number of key questions for regulators, which have been repeatedly raised in nearly four 
decades of review of northern marine transportation.6 Moreover, the regulatory regime 																																																								1	ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT REPORT 89-90 (2009), 
http://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/AMSA_2009_report/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf 
2 S.R. Stephenson, L.C. Smith & J.A. Agnew. Divergent Long-Term Trajectories of Human Access to the 
Arctic. 1 Nature Climate Change 156. 158-59 (2011) 
3 See L. Pizzolato et al., Changing Sea Ice Conditions and Marine Transportation Activity in the Canadian 
Arctic Between 1990 and 2013, 123 CLIMATIC CHANGE 161, 162-63 (2014); COUNCIL OF CANADIAN 
ACADEMIES, COMMERCIAL MARINE SHIPPING ACCIDENTS: UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS IN CANADA 49-53 
(2016). 
4 See L.C. Smith & S.R. Stephenson, New Trans-Arctic Shipping Routes Navigable by Mid-Century, 110 
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. E1191 (2013); S.R. Stephenson et al., Projected 21st-Century Changes 
to Arctic Marine Access, 118 CLIMATIC CHANGE 885, 895, 897 (2013). 
5PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, THE INTEGRATED ARCTIC CORRIDORS FRAMEWORK: PLANNING 
FOR RESPONSIBLE SHIPPING IN CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS 1 (2016),: 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/04/the-integrated-arctic-corridors-
framework.pdf.		
6 See generally, DAVID BRANDER-SMITH ET AL., PROTECTING OUR WATERS: PUBLIC REVIEW PANEL ON 
TANKER SAFETY AND MARINE SPILLS RESPONSE CAPABILITY (1990); ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 1; 
SENATE OF CAN. STANDING COMM. ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS, CONTROLLING CANADA’S ARCTIC 
WATERS; ROLE OF THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD (2009); SENATE OF CAN. STANDING COMM. ON 
FISHERIES AND OCEANS, RISING TO THE ARCTIC CHALLENGE: REPORT ON THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD 
(2009); OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, OIL SPILLS FROM SHIPS (2010); SENATE OF CAN. 
STANDING COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. AND DEF., SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN CANADA’S ARCTIC (2011); 
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, MARINE NAVIGATION IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC (2014); 
Tanker Safety Panel Secretariat, Phase II – Requirements for the Arctic and for Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances Nationally, in A REVIEW OF CANADA’S SHIP-SOURCE SPILL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: 
SETTING THE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE (2014); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT 
REVIEW, VOL. I & II (2016).. 
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governing Arctic shipping is extremely complex.7 Governed by international agreements, 
national regulations and territorial laws, different types of shipping are subjected to 
different regulatory regimes and agreements.8 Effective regulation of Arctic shipping 
poses real challenges to Canada and circumpolar governments alike.  
 A promising new initiative has emerged from the Canadian government that 
embodies an innovative way of thinking about shipping regulation in the Arctic. The 
Northern Marine Transportation Corridors (NMTC) Initiative, jointly led by the Canadian 
Coast Guard, Transport Canada and the Canadian Hydrographical Service, is a new 
policy framework aimed at developing voluntary Arctic shipping corridors throughout 
Canada’s domestic Northern waters.9* An Arctic transportation corridor is a federally 
designated shipping route that represents the safest passage for vessels and is supported 
by strategic investments in services, infrastructure, and environmental protection. 10 * 
Under this policy, designated shipping corridors would receive enhanced levels of 
financial, material, and human resource capacity to support vessel safety. 11   Arctic 
corridors will take time to build and complete. However, mature corridors should be 
supported by strategic investments in services, infrastructure, and environmental 
conservation measures. Through careful designation and tailored/site-specific 
management, corridors can be designed to minimize risk to vessels and the environment, 
and to account for the provisions of settled Inuit land claim agreements. Vessel operators 
are incentivized to use corridors in order to access higher levels of government services, 
reduce risk to their vessel and crew, and minimize their impact on the environment.12  
 The NMTC policy aims to limit the operational footprint of Arctic shipping by 
incentivizing ships to use routes where service levels and supporting infrastructure are 
highest.13 Figure 1 depicts the preliminary NMTC developed by the federal government. 
Corridors provide a strategic operational and planning framework for regulating shipping 
activities. This pragmatic initiative has received broad support from diverse 
stakeholders.14 Notably, corridors were part of the Obama-Trudeau Joint Statement on 
the Arctic and are emerging as a focus area for cooperation between the Unites States and 
Canada. 15  However, corridors remain a work in progress.  For example, the same 																																																								
7 D. VanderZwaag et al.,. Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping.  2008 Marine & Envtl. Inst. 1-4. 
8 Id. 
9 CANADIAN COAST GUARD. WARMING OF THE NORTH: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARCTIC 
TRANSPORTATION, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.2 (2015). 
https://umanitoba.ca/faculties/management/ti/media/docs/ALVARO__NMTC_Presentation.pdf 
10 See id. at 3. 
11 See id at 2-3. 
12 See id. at 3 
13 Preliminary Arctic shipping corridors ensure vessels are routed to areas that contain: (1) the most 
complete bathymetric surveying and nautical charting, (2) the greatest number of navigational aids, and (3) 
have the most expedient access to ice breaker deployment, ports, places of refuge, and government 
oversight. See Id. at 7. 
14The federal government has engaged with interested stakeholders throughout the process of developing 
the NMTC. In March 2016, the government hosted six engagement sessions on the NMTC, including in 
two northern communities. At a Canadian Marine Advisory Committee meeting for the Prairie and 
Northern Region on May 11, 2016, the government reported that the response of the engagement has been 
overwhelmingly in support of moving forward with the corridors initiative. Id. 
15 US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy and Arctic Leadership, (Washington, D.C., United States 
of America, March 10, 2016), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-
climate-energy-and-arctic-leadership. 
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academics, Inuit organizations, northern communities, and civil society groups that have 
expressed support for the concept and framework offered by Arctic shipping corridors 
have also expressed concerns that the current conceptualization of corridors lacks a 
fundamental consideration: integration of and protection for environmentally and 
culturally sensitive areas in the region.16 For corridors to reach their full potential they 
must be more than a recognition and formalization of existing traffic patterns. 
 																																																								
16 While recognizing the merits of this approach, academics, local communities, and civil society groups 
have voiced concerns that there are key gaps in the government’s preliminary design of the corridors. A 
workshop in December 2015 brought together leading Canadian academics to discuss the implications of 
arctic shipping corridors in Canada. They concluded that the government has given an incomplete 
consideration to environmental areas, that the corridors have important international implications that must 
be assessed and that Canadian Inuit must be consulted and engaged. Similar concerns were raised at 
engagement sessions that were hosted by the government in March 2016 in order to seek validation of the 
concept and social license to move forward with the corridors initiative. For a more detailed account see 
Dawson, J., Porta, L., Okuribido-Malcolm, S., deHann, M., and Mussells, O, Proceedings of the Northern 
Marine Transportation Corridors Workshop, December 8,Vancouver, B.C.’ uO Research: Ottawa, ON, 
2016, available at http://www.espg.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/NMTC_Workshop_Proceedings_FINAL_REVISED.pdf. The 
most in-depth analysis of the corridors to date is a report released in April 2016 by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts. The report, entitled The Integrated Arctic Corridors Framework, provided detailed mapping and 
analysis of the government’s preliminary corridors relative to important environmental areas and Inuit uses 
and provided a policy road map for creating integrated arctic shipping corridors. The Integrated Arctic 
Corridors Framework, The Pew Charitable Trusts, April 2016. 
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Figure 1. Preliminary Northern Marine Transportation Corridors developed jointly by the Canadian Coast 
Guard, Transport Canada and the Canadian Hydrographic Service. Primary corridors represent the most-
used routes and secondary corridors depict the routes to communities. Source: Canadian Coast Guard, 
‘Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative’ (presentation to the Company of Master Mariners of 
Canada, April 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.mastermariners.ca/maritimes/uploads/05marinecorridors.pdf, accessed July 12, 2016. 
 
 The NMTC represents the potential foundation for responsible and effective 
shipping governance in the Arctic and will guide the future of maritime transport in the 
region for the next century and beyond. Investment decisions, infrastructure 
development, resource development, and maritime trade opportunities will be leveraged 
and influenced by the location of corridors and the related services and infrastructure 
existing within their bounds. Where the corridors are located is therefore as important as 
where they are not located considering their power to guide future vessel traffic away 
from or towards certain areas. The simple act of creating corridors at all, even initial 
routes that will be re-prioritized over time, sends a message to the world - intended or not 
- that Canada’s Arctic is “open for business”. Thus there is an urgent need to carefully 
consider how the corridors can most effectively provide a foundation for an integrated 
and strategic vision for sustainable shipping in Arctic Canada that includes regulation and 
policy within and outside their boundaries.  
 Through the integration of other types of information and data currently missing 
from the initiative, corridors could become a broader framework for marine planning and 
have the potential to advance policy on a number of priority policy issues. In this article, 
we aim to assess how the corridors can develop into a strategic planning framework and 
new policy tool for regulators. We describe and analyze corridors in the broader context 
of marine law in order to depict the intersection points between Arctic shipping corridors 
and maritime regulation and governance. In particular, the Arctic shipping corridors are 
assessed with respect to (1) marine safety law, (2) Inuit land claims agreements, (3) 
protection of the marine environment, and (4) mechanisms for international cooperation.  
It should be noted that regulating shipping through the Canadian Arctic is complicated by 
a dispute over the status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) under international law. This 
article presumes the status quo (that the NWP constitutes internal waters of Canada) and 
does not address the potential implications of an international strait through the NWP.  
 
II. MARINE SAFETY 
 
 The concept of marine safety can pertain to design, construction, equipment 
requirements, crew qualifications, pollution prevention, and search and rescue. Marine 
safety in the Canadian Arctic is governed by a body of international, national, and 
territorial law, and is underpinned by services and infrastructure provided by federal 
government agencies.  
 Shipping in the Arctic is much different than shipping elsewhere in the world 
because of unique hazards such as low temperature, presence of sea ice, daylight, extreme 
weather, potential ridged ice, and remoteness. These risks require regulators to hold 
vessels travelling through Arctic waters to the highest standard possible to ensure Arctic-
ready ship design and construction, on-board equipment, crew training and voyage 
planning. The following section describes the marine safety regime that supports Arctic 
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vessel traffic in Canada and the potential for corridors to enhance implementation of this 
regime in the Arctic region and to provide a framework for the continuous improvement 
of Canadian marine safety laws and governance. 
 At the international level, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) creates the basic legal framework for all activities associated with the Arctic 
maritime domain, including shipping.17 UNCLOS codifies a range of maritime zones and 
the degree of rights and obligations that coastal (and other) states have with regards to 
each zone. A suite of IMO conventions and resolutions support this regime and establish 
the international regulatory framework for Arctic shipping. All eight Arctic states - 
Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States - are parties to the six (described below) 
key international shipping safety Conventions 18 .  These Conventions contain safety 
standards and regulations that are followed by each Arctic state as they pertain to 
shipping safety of large vessels.19, 20   
 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) is the 
most significant international convention concerning marine safety.21  Its main objective 
is to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment, and operation of ships.  
Other conventions managed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that 
pertain to marine safety include the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 73/78 (MARPOL), the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW), the International 
Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 2001 (AFS), the 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 
(COLREG), and the International Convention on Load Lines (Load Lines).22  
																																																								
17 Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and Arctic Shipping, 22:1 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 67, 68-99 
(2013). 
18 There are a few exceptions regarding select annexes and amendments: SOLAS Amendment 1996 does 
not include Canada, United States, Russia, or Iceland as Parties; MARPOL Annex 4 (re: sewage discharge) 
does not include Iceland or the U.S.; and STCW Amendment 1995 does not include Sweden, United States 
or Finland). International Maritime Organization (October 10 2016). Status of multilateral Conventions and 
instruments in respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs 
depositary or other functions. Status of Convetions, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202016.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 20 2016).  
19 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, Oct. 5, 2001; United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396;Protocol of 1978 Relating to 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 184; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2; 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, July 7, 
1973, 1361 U.N.T.S. 2;  Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
1972, Oct. 20, 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17; International Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 640 
U.N.T.S. 133. 
20 These conventions typically apply to passenger ships, cargo ships over 500GT, and to varying extents to 
cargo ships between 300-500GT. 
21 Brief History of IMO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, (2016) Available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx 
22 Maritime Safety, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, (2016) 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/Default.aspx. 
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 Until recently, none of these conventions contained provisions that address the 
unique and considerable risks of shipping through the Arctic.23 To address this gap, the 
IMO has spent the last several years developing a mandatory International Code of Safety 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) to replace its existing set of optional 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. 24   The mandatory Polar Code will 
supplement the aforementioned existing IMO instruments in order to improve the safety 
of shipping in polar waters when it enters into force on 1 January 2017.25* The Code 
covers design, construction, equipment, operations, training, search and rescue, and 
environmental protection measures relevant to ships operating in both Arctic and 
Antarctic waters.26 The safety regulations of the Polar Code were adopted by the IMO in 
November 2014 as an add-on code to SOLAS, while the environmental regulations were 
adopted in May 2015 as an add-on code to MARPOL.27  
 Designing the Polar Code was an extended, consensus-based project involving 
States, NGOs, and industry representatives, and represents only the mandatory minimum 
safety standards to be met by polar vessels.28 The IMO’s priority was primarily to reach a 
consensus and enact mandatory requirements in a timely manner.29 A central shortcoming 
of Polar Code is that it does not provide strong enough protection for the environment, 
including the lack of a ban on heavy fuel oil, which was blocked by the Russian 
Federation due to its reliance on heavy fuel oil for its domestic shipping operations.30 
 International law making can be slow and has a history of being reactive.31 Since 
the Arctic cannot wait for a major loss of life or pollution event before substantial 
policymaking occurs, it will be up to national governments to drive stronger regulations 
through unilateral and bi-lateral policy and legislative initiatives.	  For its part, Canada has 
already established several Arctic-specific legal instruments to support safety of 
navigation.32 Canada’s Arctic vessel safety regulatory regime is arguably the strongest of 
all circumpolar nations and as such, much of Canada’s work has been to raise the 
																																																								
23 With the exception of training requirements for arctic seafarers in the STCW and updates to SOLAS 
Chapter V regarding meteorological services and warnings to include ice data, Ice Patrol Services and 
danger messages including for ice conditions. Aldo Chircop, Ships in Transit, Regimes in Transition: 
Regulating International Navigation and Shipping in the Arctic presented at Arctic Frontiers, Tromsø, 
Norway, 22 January 2014, available at http://www.arcticfrontiers.com/downloads/arctic-frontiers-
2014/conference-presentations-3/wednesday-22-january-2014/629-05-aldo-chircop/file, (last accessed July 
12, 2016.  
24 International Maritime Organization. Shipping in polar waters. (2016),: 
http://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/polar/pages/default.aspx. 
25 International Maritime Organization, supra note 24. 
26 International Maritime Organization, supra note 24. 
27 International Maritime Organization, supra note 24. 
28  David Snider. 2014 in Review: Polar Shipping (December 16, 2014), http://www.maritime-
executive.com/features/2014-in-Review-Polar-Shipping. 
29 Snider, supra note 28. 
30 Bob Weber, Polar Code still leaves significant gaps, experts say, CBC NEWs, May 13, 2015, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/polar-code-still-leaves-significant-gaps-experts-say-1.3073036. 
31 Chircop, supra note 23. 
32  See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12); Arctic Shipping Pollution 
Prevention Regulations (C.R.C., c. 353); Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations 
(SOR/2010-127) 
71 	
standards for artic shipping through action at the international level, including the Arctic 
Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and the mandatory Polar Code.33 
 Canada’s national regulatory regime for Arctic shipping – codified in the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) - meets a higher standard than the Polar 
Code.34 This AWPPA was motivated by sovereignty concerns following the transit of the 
US tanker Manhattan in 1969, and Canada has since justified this unilateral action under 
international law based on a special provision negotiated into the UNCLOS.35 
 The AWPPA establishes a 200-nautical mile pollution prevention zone, where 
discharges of waste are strictly prohibited with limited exceptions.36 The AWPPA and its 
Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) create Arctic-specific 
requirements for certain ships such as: (1) ship construction standards, (2) special 
equipment requirements, (3) mandatory insurance, (4) on-board ice navigators, (5) 
pollution prevention officers, and (6) additional liabilities for pollution. 37  Under the 
AWPPA, liability applies both to the owner of a ship and the owner of its cargo, and 
covers all costs incurred by the Crown to repair, remedy, reduce, or mitigate damage, as 
well as all actual loss or damage incurred by other persons up to a limit.38 The ASPPR 
divides the Canadian arctic into 16 shipping safety control zones where access is granted 
based on a zone/date system.39 Figure 2, below, depicts ASPPR Shipping Safety Control 
Zones. Access to these zones is granted based on a zone/date system in conjunction with 
the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS).40  In order to access these waters, 
certain classes of vessels are also subject to the reporting requirements under the 
Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG).41 
																																																								
33  Olav Schram Stoke,. Regime interplay in Arctic shipping governance: explaining regional niche 
selection. 13 Int’l Environ Agreements 65-85 at 77(2013). 
34 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12. 
35  Article 234 of the UNCLOS provides: “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe 
climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or 
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or 
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to 
navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific evidence." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396.  
36 Oil may only be discharged for the purposes of saving life or preventing the loss of a ship; damage from 
stranding, collision or foundering; or through the exhaust of an engine or through leakage from an 
underwater machinery component necessary to ship function. Domestic waste and industrial waste deposits 
are also permitted with appropriate authorizations under federal legislation. 
37 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.A-12; Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention 
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 353. 
38 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.A-12. 
39 Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C., c. 353. 
40 Transport Canada. Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) Standards - TP 12259E. (1998). 
41 Id.  
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Figure 2. ASPPR Shipping Safety Control Zones. Source: Transport Canada, ‘Arctic Ice Regime Shipping 
System (AIRSS) Standards - TP 12259’, modified 2010-03-24, available at 
https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/images/marinesafety/appendixa-lg.jpg, (last accessed July 12, 2016).  
 
 In 2010, Canada imposed mandatory reporting requirements for certain vessels 
that wish to navigate within NORDREG, including the Mackenzie River.42 Mandatory 
reporting to NORDREG now applies to: (1) vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more, (2) 
vessels that are engaged in towing or pushing another vessel, if the combined gross 
tonnage is 500 gross tonnage or more, and (3) vessels carrying a pollutant or dangerous 
goods. 43 
 In spite of Canada’s longstanding Arctic-specific marine law that includes the 
most stringent Arctic-specific legislation governing shipping, the Arctic region 
experiences a disproportionately high number of accidents compared to other regions in 																																																								
42 The NORDREG zone includes: the shipping safety control zones prescribed by the Shipping Safety 
Control Zones Order; the waters of Ungava Bay, Hudson Bay and Kugmallit Bay that are not in a shipping 
safety control zone; the waters of James Bay; the waters of the Koksoak River from Ungava Bay to 
Kuujjuaq; the waters of Feuilles Bay from Ungava Bay to Tasiujaq; the waters of Chesterfield Inlet that are 
not within a shipping safety control zone, and the waters of Baker Lake; and the waters of the Moose River 
from James Bay to Moosonee. (Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, SOR/2010-
127).  
43  There are three main types of reports required: a sailing plan when vessels are about to enter the 
NORDREG zone and before they depart from a berth within the NORDREG zone; a periodic position 
report once daily; a final report upon arrival at a berth within the zone or immediately before exiting the 
zone; and a deviation report when the vessel deviates significant from their sailing plan.  (Northern Canada 
Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, SOR/2010-127).  
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Canada.44  Thus, regulation alone is not sufficient to guarantee safe shipping. Arctic 
governments must also provide nautical charting, navigational aids, ice and weather 
information, supporting infrastructure, and safety services. The vastness and remoteness 
of the region, coupled with historically low levels of vessel traffic and correspondingly 
low investment, has created a deficit in these critical, operational aspects of arctic 
shipping. In regions such as the Arctic, where there is a limited tax base to warrant 
significant investment in regional and local infrastructure, there needs to be different 
funding formulas for decision-making.45  Building these resources now, in response to 
increasing shipping and future prospects presents a significant challenge to federal 
agencies.  
 In order to effectively support marine safety in the Arctic, coordinated and 
strategic implementation of these laws and protocols is critical. To date, the Canadian 
government has yet to develop an overarching vision and strategy for arctic shipping. 
This has resulted in an ad hoc approach that in the long term will not meet the shipping 
needs of Canada.46 An effective approach to marine safety in the Arctic will require the 
application of a risk-based framework that can account for both the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of risk, life, and environment in Canada’s northern waters. The corridors 
initiative provides an opportunity for establishing that framework.  
 A recent report by the Pew Charitable Trusts, The Integrated Arctic Corridors 
Framework: Planning for responsible shipping in Canada’s Arctic waters, describes a 
roadmap for creating, classifying, and managing a network of Arctic marine shipping 
corridors based on the level of risk to vessels, the environment, and Inuit cultural, 
subsistence, and economic practices.47 The authors describe the need for site-specific 
strategies for corridor safety – including developing site-specific management strategies 
in corridors where risk is greatest to humans, vessels, and wildlife.  
 Corridors are a tool for identifying and incentivizing the use of the “safest route” 
through a given area or to a specific destination.48 The “safest route” means using an 
integrated risk analysis that considers risks to vessels as well as risks to the environment, 
and to local people, in particular Inuit.  This includes recognition that areas outside the 
corridors are riskier routes and vessels travelling within these areas could potentially be 
subjected to elevated scrutiny and safety requirements as well as possible insurance 
implications. The voluntary nature of corridors helps to avoid jurisdictional issues under 
the UNCLOS. However, it serves as a framework of implementing national (AWPPA, 
etc.) regimes, regional regimes (Arctic Council agreements), and international regimes 
(UNCLOS, Polar Code, MARPOL, etc.). 
 
III. INUIT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENTS 
																																																								
44 Council of Canadian Academies, supra note  3. 
45  See NAT’L ABORIGINAL ECON. DEV. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS ON NORTHERN INFRASTRUCTURE TO 
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2016), http://naedb-cndea.com/reports/recommendations-on-northern-
infrastructure.pdf. 
46 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., Supra at 9-11. 
47THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE INTEGRATED ARCTIC CORRIDORS FRAMEWORK: PLANNING FOR 
RESPONSIBLE SHIPPING IN CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS 20-21 (2016). 
48 CANADIAN COAST GUARD,  Supra at 10. 
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 At present, neither national nor international legislation governing Arctic shipping 
acknowledges the use of sea ice by Inuit.49 Five settled Inuit land claims agreements in 
Canada afford Inuit constitutionally protected legal rights to ensure management and 
decision-making over their lands and waters. Arctic shipping has the potential to affect 
Inuit ability to use sea ice and waters and Inuit engagement on this issue is critical so that 
communities have the opportunity to minimize risks, maximize opportunities, and can 
shape and engage in management, monitoring, and pollution prevention and response.  
 The risks posed by increasing shipping traffic include potential for restricting and 
endangering travel over ice and water, disturbances to local wildlife, and the 
contamination of traditional food sources, among others. Movement over ice is an 
integral aspect of Inuit culture and identity.  The Inuit Circumpolar Council of Canada, in 
a series of interviews, found communities were committed to preserving their traditional 
diet despite a changing climate and subsequent shifts in wildlife migrations and 
abundance. 50  Therefore, hunters often travel further from communities in order to 
maintain food and cultural security. Icebreaking vessels can negatively affect sea ice 
conditions, including altering typically well-known ice conditions or travel routes - 
potentially cutting off safe routes home for Inuit.  
 Increased shipping in the Arctic is also expected to disrupt how Inuit can access 
wildlife.  Potential challenges include: (1) introduction of contamination or invasive 
species into the marine environment; (2) dissemination of underwater noise and light 
pollution which has been shown to disturb wildlife; (3) vessel strikes of marine 
mammals; (4) alteration of sea ice pattern, integrity, and resilience, and (5) habitat 
degradation for ice-dependent species. 51  Inuit also may suffer from contamination of 
country food resulting from ship source pollution or spill events.  
 Oil spills in particular are of great concern to Inuit as they could potentially 
contaminate country food sources and result in food insecurity. The devastating 
consequences of large oil spill events to a productive marine ecosystem were exemplified 
by the 1989 Exxon-Valdez spill, which caused extreme environmental, social, economic, 
and cultural damages.52 The clean-up operation alone cost approximately $2.5 billion.53 
In the criminal plea agreement Exxon was fined $150 million, the highest penalty ever (at 
the time) for an environmental offense. Exxon paid an additional $100 million in criminal 																																																								
49 See INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CAN., THE SEA ICE IS OUR HIGHWAY: AN INUIT  
PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSPORTATION IN THE ARCTIC (2008), 
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/20080423_iccamsa_finalpdfprint.pdf; INUIT 
CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CAN., THE SEA ICE NEVER STOPS: REFLECTIONS  ON SEA ICE USE AND SHIPPING IN 
INUIT NUNAAT (2014), http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/sea_ice_never_stops_-
_final.pdf. 
50 INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CAN., THE SEA ICE IS OUR HIGHWAY Supra at 11. 
51 See  ARCTIC COUNCIL Supra at 6-7. 
52 LAWRENCE PALINKAS ET AL.,, Social, Cultural, and Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
52 Hum. Org. 1, 1 (Spring 1993); GARY SHIGENAKA, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL 
SPILL: NOAA’S SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT, MONITORING, AND RESEARCH 7 (2014), 
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/Exxon_Valdez_25YearsAfter_508
_0.pdf.  
53 Governments’ Memorandum in Support of Agreement and Consent Decree at 3, United States v. Exxon 
Corp., No. A91-082 CIV (D. Alaska 1991), 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/History/GovMemo.pdf. 
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restitution and $900 million in a civil settlement.54 A class action lawsuit was brought 
against Exxon Mobile by 32,000 fishermen, Alaska indigenous peoples, and others whose 
economic livelihoods were compromised by the spill. A spill of this magnitude in 
Canada’s Arctic could permanently damage Inuit food and cultural security.  
 Despite the lack of acknowledgement of Inuit use of sea ice in shipping 
regulations, there are some avenues for legal recourse in the case of ship source oil spills 
through a system of liability. The AWPPA, Canada Shipping Act (2001) (CSA), and the 
Marine Liability Act (2001) (MLA), form the basis of Canada’s legal regime for oil-spill 
preparedness and liability. The AWPPA is a “zero discharge” Act which states “no 
person or ship shall deposit or permit the deposit of waste of any type in the Arctic 
waters.”55 This includes the deposition of waste on any mainland or island where the 
waste may enter Arctic waters.56  The Act provides for a system of civil liability and for 
the designation of pollution prevention officers for enforcement purposes. Punishments 
for offences under the AWPPA include monetary fines and forfeiture of ship and cargo.57 
 The MLA implements the liability schemes from several international 
conventions. These include the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1992 (CLC),58 articles 1 to 10 of the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (Bunkers Convention), 59  the 
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention),60 and, 
finally, the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 and the 2003 protocol to that Convention 
(together also known as the IOPCF Convention).61 																																																								
54 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Settlement (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/settlement.cfm. 
55  Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. A-12 (Can.). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 The CLC provides for compensation for persons (including Inuit) who suffer oil pollution damage 
resulting from ship source oil pollution, by placing liability on the ship owner of the polluting vessel The 
Convention applies to all seagoing vessels actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo, but only ships carrying 
more than 2,000 tons of oil are required to maintain insurance in respect of oil pollution damage. ( 1992 
Protocol to amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 4(1), 
Nov. 27 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255.)  
59 The Bunkers Convention require ships over 1,000 gross tonnage must maintain insurance or other 
financial security to cover the liability for pollution damage of registered owners in an amount equal to the 
limits of liability under the applicable national or international limitation regime. International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, art. 7(1) Mar. 23, 2001, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (2005) 
(Cm 6693).  
60 The HNS Convention establishes a comprehensive two-tier compensation regime covering pollution 
damage from the hazardous and noxious substances carried by ships, as well as the risks of fire and 
explosion (e.g., loss of life, personal injury, and property damage). Tier one provides for compensation 
from ship owner insurance policies, while tier two provides for any necessary additional compensation 
from the HNS Fund, created by the Convention. (International Convention on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea art. 12-14 May 
3, 1996, 35 ILM 1406)  
61 The IOPCF Convention creates the international compensation fund and a supplementary fund (IOPC 
Fund) to compensate for oil pollution damage covered by the CLC and the Bunkers Convention. (Protocol 
of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the establishment of an international fund for 
compensation for oil pollution damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 330; 2003 Protocol to the 1992 
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 The MLA specifies the entitlement of the government to recover the costs of spill 
response from the polluter, with the liability always being placed on the polluter. There is 
currently no criminal liability for ship pollution in Canada. In addition to the liability 
funds created under the international regime, the MLA created the Ship-source Oil 
Pollution Fund (SOPF), which is financed by levies paid by shippers and receivers of oil 
in Canada. The SOPF may provide a mechanism by which Inuit who are negatively 
impacted by shipping pollution could claim compensation. If the Inuit individuals are part 
of the fishing industry, they may claim loss of income caused by ship-source oil 
pollution. Other classes of claims for which the SOPF may be liable include the 
following: claims for oil pollution damage; claims for costs and expenses of oil spill 
clean-up, preventive measures and monitoring; and claims for oil pollution damage and 
clean-up; costs where the cause of the oil pollution damage is unknown and the 
Administrator of the SOPF has been unable to establish that the occurrence that gave rise 
to the damage was not caused by a ship.  
 An affected Inuit group could also bring a claim for compensation directly against 
a ship owner’s insurer, if the Bunkers Convention applies (i.e., the pollution is caused by 
a Bunkers Convention certified vessel over 1,000 GT). Finally, Inuit groups subject to the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement also have a preventative or precautionary measure 
available to them in the form of the power to approve shipping activities that are 
associated with extractive projects via their project proposals.  Companies submit 
proposals to the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB), which include a description of 
proposed marine shipping vessels, routes, frequency, subject to the NIRB’s approval.  
There may be available mechanisms for incorporating compensation for any shipping 
damages into the Project Certificates issued by the NIRB. 
 The development of Arctic corridors offers the opportunity for a clear and 
transparent mechanism to implement provisions of Inuit land claim agreements by 
engaging Inuit and their land claims institutions in decision-making, management, 
recognition of Traditional Knowledge, and the assessment of current liability limits for 
ship-based pollution. Presently, liability limits underestimate the costs of spill prevention, 
response, remediation, and victim compensation when compared to past spill response 
efforts throughout the world.  Many factors contribute to the extreme variability of costs 
associated with a marine oil spill.  According to the International Tanker Owners 
Pollution Federation there are six dynamics which affect the total cost: (1) type of oil 
spilled, (2) physical, biological and economic characteristics of the spill location, (3) 
weather and sea conditions, (4) amount spilled and rate of spillage, (5) time of year, and 
(6) management and effectiveness of response operations.62 Given the abstract nature of 
these factors, ascertaining a defensible and verifiable assessment of the range of potential 
costs associated with marine oil spill events, analysis must focus on case study data. 
When oil hits water what do we know to be true?  In extreme cases, such as the Macondo 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, total costs can reach upwards of $65 billion. 63  Arctic 																																																																																																																																																																					
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, May 16, 2003, 2012 UKTS 48)  
62 I.C. White and F. Molloy, Factors that Determine the Cost of Oil Spills, THE INTERNATIONAL TANKER 
OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION LIMITED (Apr. 2003), http://www.itopf.com/knowledge-
resources/documents-guides/document/factors-that-determine-the-cost-of-oil-spill-2003/.. 
63  Chris Baltimore, Factbox: What's BP's potential pricetag for Macondo?, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2012),  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/03/us-bp-costs-idUSTRE8220R320120303. 
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corridors offer the chance for Inuit engagement in the determination of liability limits for 
oil spills in areas that will affect them the most. 
 
IV. PROTECTING SENSITIVE MARINE AREAS 
  
The Arctic environment is facing unprecedented changes due to climate change. 
In particular, the loss of sea ice is fundamentally altering ocean dynamics and challenging 
the resilience of Arctic ecosystems. In this shifting and vulnerable environment, 
increased access by ships, including shipping associated with large-scale development 
projects, warrants enhanced scrutiny and attention.  Regulators and Inuit organizations 
must carefully consider how and when vessel traffic should be permitted in sensitive 
marine areas so as not to unduly disrupt fragile habitat and sensitive or at-risk species.  
 The preamble to the AWPPA underscores Canada’s commitment to Arctic 
development that occurs in step with environmental protection and stewardship, and with 
due regard for the wellbeing of Inuit. 64  Exploitation of the natural resources of the 
Canadian Arctic is beginning to occur at a greater scale than in the past, and is being 
facilitated through access by large vessels.65 Not only are more and larger ships using the 
Canadian Arctic but shipping also exhibits a high degree of concurrence with important 
ecological areas.66 Figure 3, below, depicts the overlap between recent shipping patterns 
and areas of ecological importance in the Canadian Arctic.67 The Northwest Passage is in 
fact a network of passages for humans, vessels, fish, birds, and marine mammals. In 
practice, it is not possible for ships to simply avoid all environmentally sensitive areas. 
To keep pace with emerging developments in the marine environment and ensure the 
sustainability of arctic shipping, Canada is preparing to identify and protect its most 
sensitive Arctic marine areas.68 																																																								
64 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c A-12 (Can.) (“Parliament […] recognizes and is 
determined to fulfil its obligation to see that the natural resources of the Canadian arctic are developed and 
exploited and the arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic are navigated 
only in a manner that takes cognizance of Canada’s responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit and other 
inhabitants of the Canadian arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in 
the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian arctic”). 
65 In recent years, the Canadian Arctic has begun to host some of the largest ships ever to access its waters. 
Shipping associated with large scale mining projects, such as the Baffinland iron ore mine in North Baffin 
Island, the Meadowbank mine in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut and the Raglan mine in northern Nunavik, 
are bringing intensive vessel traffic to certain routes.See,MV Nunavik the newest icebreaker to hit Arctic 
waters, CBS NEWS (Mar 24, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/mv-nunavik-the-newest-
icebreaker-to-hit-arctic-waters-1.2583861; Holly Birkett, First panamax carries iron ore from Canada’s 
Arctic to Europe. SPLASH 24/7 (Aug. 31, 2015), http://splash247.com/first-panamax-carries-iron-ore-from-
canadas-arctic-to-europe/. 
66 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 5.,  
67 Figure 3. Ship tracks (2014) overlap with important ecological areas in the Canadian Arctic. Canadian 
Important Bird Areas, IBA CANADA, http://www.ibacanada.ca/explore_how.jsp?lang=EN; S.A. Stephenson 
and L. Hartwig, The Arctic Marine Workshop, FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/341178.pdf; Lori T. Quakenbush, Robert J. Small, and John J. Citta, 
Satellite Tracking of Bowhead Whales, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.data.boem.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/5/5343.pdf. 
68 The federal government has made domestic and international commitments to protect 5% of marine and 
coastal areas by 2017 and 10% by 2020. The Prime Minister’s mandate letters to the Minster of 
Environment and Climate Change and the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, 
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Figure 3 exactAIS Archive, Satellite AIS Data—Arctic, http://www.exactearth.com; Flanders Marine 
Institute, ‘VLIZ Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase’, available at http://www.marineregions.org, accessed 
Sept. 4, 2015. 
 
 The federal government has not adequately considered how the preliminary 
corridors development or use overlaps with environmentally sensitive areas, nor has it 
sufficiently identified culturally sensitive areas. In their current design, 77% of the 
preliminary corridors overlap with areas that have been officially designated as 
ecologically or biologically significant. 69  It is unclear what percentage overlap with 
significant or sensitive cultural sites, as these sites have not yet been adequately 
inventoried in the region. Despite these overlaps and gaps, the corridors have the 
potential to be an important tool for protecting sensitive marine areas. They provide a 
framework for determining and implementing the most appropriate conservation tool in 
areas affected by shipping. There are a number of options for enhancing protection for 
sensitive marine areas using the corridors as a framework, including (a) refining corridor 
design, (b) pursuing international shipping designations, (c) creating marine protected 
areas, (d) creating special management zones, and (e) improving environmental response 
capacity.  
A. Refining Corridor Design 
 Corridors are a way of encouraging the use of safe areas by mariners, and 
conversely, they are a way of discouraging vessels from operating in unsafe or sensitive 
areas. By excluding the most vulnerable and sensitive marine areas from the corridors 
design, these critical areas are afforded a de facto level of protection from shipping. 																																																																																																																																																																					
published in December 2015, to reiterated the government’s intention to meet these goals. See Justin 
Trudeau, Ministerial Mandate Letter to the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-fisheries-oceans-and-canadian-coast-guard-mandate-letter.  
69 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS , supra note 5. 
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Analysis published by the Pew Charitable Trusts demonstrated the potential gains to the 
shipping industry and environment that could be achieved by integrating information on 
ecological and Inuit use areas into corridors design. Using the preliminary corridors in the 
Beaufort Sea as a case study, the analysis found that the corridors unnecessarily 
coincided with significant ecological and biological areas in the Canadian Beaufort Sea 
region.70 By re-assessing and refining corridor placement, the authors were able to argue 
for and demonstrate how a smaller corridor footprint would interfere with 25% less area 
designated as important for wildlife and Inuit use, and exclude a greater proportion of 
hazardous ice areas, all while capturing a greater amount of annual vessel traffic.71  
 An integrated approach that incorporates protection for sensitive marine areas is a 
simple and cost effective means of supporting sustainable Arctic shipping future for 
Canada. Yet, many of the Canada’s most travelled Arctic passages are bottlenecks for 
ships, local users and marine animals. In these places, such as the Kitikmeot region, 
Lancaster Sound, Hudson Strait, and parts of the Beaufort Sea, it is impossible to exclude 
all sensitive areas from the corridors. In order to effectively manage sensitive areas 
within the corridors, protective measures outside of corridors must be present.  
Designations by the IMO such as marine protected areas (MPAs), or special management 
zones need to be developed and incorporated into corridor governance and management. 
Presently there are no IMO designations in the Canadian Arctic. 
 
B.  International Maritime Organization Designations 
  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) offers a number of solutions for 
protecting marine areas where shipping has the potential to negatively impact the 
environment. Special IMO measures for enhancing environmental protection in 
analogous regions – such as the North American Emissions Control Area and the heavy 
fuel oil ban in the Antarctic – do not apply to Arctic waters. The Polar Code will enhance 
protection for the Arctic, however, as described above, it provides a minimum standard 
for safety Arctic shipping and is not sufficient to protect the Arctic’s most vulnerable or 
important areas. 
 The most relevant IMO designation for Arctic shipping corridors is the 
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA).72 A PSSA is a special designation for areas 
where international shipping has the potential to negatively impact the environmental, 
socio-economic, or scientific value of the area.73 Once a PSSA has been approved by the 
IMO, special measures can be brought to bear on maritime activities.74 These include 
routeing measures, areas to be avoided (ATBA), strict application of MARPOL discharge 																																																								
70 Id. at 17-18. 
71 Id. at 20.  
72 Special Area designations, available under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL), are also of interest for the Arctic – in particular related to emissions control and 
use and carriage of heavy fuel oil – however these zones are typically applied to a much larger area and 
therefore their implementation in the Arctic is not facilitated by the corridors approach. Presently, there are 
no special area designations north of the 60th parallel. Special Areas Under MARPOL, IMO www.imo.org 
/en/OurWork/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/pages/Default.aspx  (last visited Dec. 7, 2016).   
73  International Maritime Organization. Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (October 20 2016), 
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx.  
74 Id.  
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and equipment requirements for ships, such as oil tankers, and installation of Vessel 
Traffic Services.75 IMO designations are well recognized by the shipping industry and 
can be highly effective, even when voluntary. This effectiveness was demonstrated in the 
Roseway Basin ATBA, recognized by the IMO in 2007.76 The Roseway Basin ATBA 
protects an area in Atlantic Canada where risk of vessel strikes with endangered right 
whales was particularly high. Despite its voluntary nature, high levels of compliance 
within just the first five months of implementation resulted in an 82% reduction in the 
risk of lethal vessel strikes to right whales within the ATBA.77 
 A drawback of the PSSA designation, however, is that a candidate area must be 
vulnerable to impacts from international shipping.78 Given that most of the shipping 
currently occurring in the Canadian Arctic is destinational, sensitive marine areas in the 
Canadian Arctic may not qualify for such designations at this time. However, Canada can 
choose to enact unilateral area designations in the interest of environmental protection 
from shipping without the need to seek IMO approval using Article 234 of UNCLOS.79 
 
C. Marine Protected Areas 
  
There are three principal options under Canadian federal law for the creation of a 
marine protected area (MPA). First an MPA can be created under s.35 of the Oceans 
Act;80 second an MPA can be created as a protected marine area under the terms of the 
Canada Wildlife Act, 81  and third, an MPA can be established as a national marine 
conservation area (NMCA) under the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act.82 
Marine areas may also be protected as Migratory Bird Sanctuaries,83 National Wildlife 
Areas84 or as National Parks.85 The Oceans Act accords the Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans the responsibility to “lead and coordinate the development and implementation of 
a national system of marine protected areas on behalf of the Government of Canada.”86 
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) adopted Canada’s Federal Marine 
Protected Areas Strategy in 2005 with the goal of establishing “a network of marine 
protected areas, established and managed within an integrated oceans management 
framework, that contributes to the health of Canada’s oceans and marine 
																																																								
75 Id. 
76 Angela S.M. Vanderlaan & Christopher T. Taggert, Efficacy of a Voluntary Area to Be Avoided to 
Reduce Risk of Lethal Vessel Strikes to Endangered Whales, 23(6) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1467, 1468 
(2009). 
77 Id. at 1467–1474. 
78 International Maritime Organization. Res. A.982(24), ¶ 1.2 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
79 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 234, Dec. 10, 1982,, 1833 UNTS 397. 
80 Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c 31 (Can.).  
81 Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C. 1985, c W-9 (Can.). 
82 Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, S.C. 2002, c 18 (Can.). 
83 See Migratory Birds Sanctuary Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c 1036 (Can.). 
84 See Canada Wildlife Act, Supra note 53. 
85 See Canada National Parks Act, S.C. 2000, c 32 (Can.). See generally, CANADA’S FEDERAL MARINE 
PROTECTED AREAS STRATEGY 5 (2005).  (Referring to additional possibilities including critical habitat 
designation under the Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c 29 (Can.), and a closure under the Fisheries Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c F-14 (Can.).) 
86 Oceans Act, supra note 52. 
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environments.”87 The Strategy emphasises that the federal government is “committed to 
working with affected Aboriginal Peoples throughout Canada to collaboratively plan, 
establish and manage marine protected areas.”88 
 Canadian federal government is presently considering how to meet its 
commitment under the Convention on Biological Diversity to protect 10% of domestic 
waters by 2020.89 The Obama-Trudeau Joint Arctic Statement further underscored the 
connection between shipping corridors and marine protection by calling for “an 
ambitious conservation goal for the Arctic,” and “low impact shipping corridors.”90 Arctic 
shipping corridors provide a framework for understanding how shipping activities 
interact with sensitive marine ecology, biology, and oceanography. Parts of critical 
marine habitat areas of vulnerable or at-risk species that cannot be completely excluded 
from the corridors system should become prime candidates for marine protection by the 
federal government. 
 The federal government’s Marine Protected Areas Strategy also outlines the goal 
of creating a network of MPAs to increase the effectiveness and connectivity of 
individual protected areas.91  Because corridors represent the most used routes for ships 
as well as key migratory routes for wildlife,92 the corridors initiative provides a valuable 
tool for planning such a network. A network of Arctic MPAs will be most effective if it is 
designed to work in coordination with present and future ship traffic.  
 
V. MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
  
Circumpolar nations share many of the same challenges related to Arctic 
shipping.93 Regionally, Arctic nations are working together through the Arctic Council 
and in other bi- and multi-national forums to coordinate and cooperate on key issues. 
Arctic shipping corridors offer a political and operational framework for addressing these 
challenges in coordination with other circumpolar nations, and have already been 
identified as a key focus area for cooperation between the United States and Canada.94 
 Recognizing the unique challenges facing mariners and regulators in the Arctic, 
circumpolar nations began making important strides towards formal cooperation 
following the release of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) in 2009. 
Developed by the Arctic Council, with leadership from Canada, the Unites States and 
Finland, the AMSA is the most comprehensive assessment of shipping risks in the Arctic 
to date and provides a policy road map for decision-makers to enhance safety, security 
and environmental protection of Arctic waters. 95  Key recommendations from the 																																																								
87 CANADA’S FEDERAL MARINE PROTECTED AREAS STRATEGY, at 12. 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2020 Biodiversity Goals & Targets for Canada (2015), available at 
http://www.biodivcanada.ca/default.asp.  90	US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy and Arctic Leadership, supra note 15. 
91 CANADA’S FEDERAL MARINE PROTECTED AREAS STRATEGY, supra note 59. 
92 The Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 5. 
93 For example, providing services in support of safe navigation, coordinating search and rescue activities, 
protecting sensitive environments, facilitating regional economic development, and ensuring shipping 
incidents can be addressed in a timely and effective manner. (Arctic Council, supra note 1).  
94 US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy and Arctic Leadership, 2016. 
95 Arctic Council, supra n 1, at 3. 
82 	
assessment include the need for international cooperation, arctic-specific IMO standards, 
multi-lateral cooperation and capacity building for search and rescue and emergency 
response, engagement with Arctic communities, protection for marine mammals, special 
designations for ecologically and culturally sensitive areas, and investment in supporting 
infrastructure and service, among others.  
 Since 2009, the international and circumpolar communities have made progress 
on several of these recommendations. Most notably, a mandatory IMO Polar Code will 
be implemented in January 2017, and two legally binding international agreements have 
been negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council – one on cooperation on Search 
and Rescue operations in 2011 and another on cooperation on oil pollution preparedness 
and response in 2013.96 Though these agreements have been criticized for not going far 
enough,97 they are a starting point for international cooperation in the Arctic and provide 
the foundation for future work on shared issues.  
 Integrated shipping corridors offer a pragmatic and innovative approach for 
bringing circumpolar nations together in bi-lateral and multilateral forums to explore 
achievable international policy for Arctic shipping. Through the creation, development, 
and management of integrated corridors, Arctic shipping can be made safer and more 
affordable while strengthening environmental protection and protecting the rights of 
Arctic Indigenous peoples.  Arctic-specific bodies created to coordinate international 
action, such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum or the Arctic Council, could advance 
cooperation and diplomacy among circumpolar nations and international partners by 
championing the development of integrated arctic shipping corridors. 
 The Arctic is unique in that circumpolar nations have been able to cooperate on 
shared priorities here, in spite of geopolitical conflict in other regions. Responsible 
economic development, human and vessel safety, environmental protection, and rights of 
Indigenous peoples are priorities shared by all Arctic nations98.	 Voluntary, integrated 																																																								
96 Arctic Council, Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic (2011), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/531/EDOCS-
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97 See, e.g. , Kevin McGwin, Better than nothing: Environment groups and the shipping industry welcome 
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shipping corridors present a holistic vision that could serve as a road map for pan-Arctic 
solutions to the next generation of shipping challenges. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
The Arctic poses some of the most hazardous shipping conditions on Earth. Ice-
infested waters, low-visibility, extreme cold, and severe weather are just some of the 
challenges faced by mariners. In the coming decade, declining Arctic sea ice is going to 
result in more unpredictable weather and hazardous multi-year ice floes throughout the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago.99  A special regime is emerging that aims to address the 
unique hazards of operating in this region and account for its sensitive marine 
environment.  
 Arctic shipping corridors are a strategic policy framework that, when fully 
implemented, will help to ensure vessels travel along the safest routes while minimizing 
their impact to the environment and to the Inuit who call the region home. This article 
argued the safest route can be defined using an integrated risk analysis that considered 
risks to vessels as well as risks to the environment and to local people, in particular Inuit. 
Areas outside the corridors would therefore be considered riskier routes and vessels 
travelling in these areas could potentially be subjected to elevated scrutiny, safety, and 
insurance requirements. 
 As presented above, the ability to direct shipping into designated, classified, 
developed, and managed corridors will dramatically reduce risk in Canada’s Arctic 
Ocean. All efforts should be made to promote the use of these shipping corridors through 
regulation and voluntary mechanisms and by regularly re-assessing the corridors based 
on new scientific information and emerging local knowledge. Nonetheless, vessel transits 
will continue to take place beyond the system of corridors, though hopefully at reduced 
levels. Shipping activities that are most likely to fall beyond the corridors include Coast 
Guard transit, scientific journeys, tourism, and subsistence fishing. Risker navigation 
beyond the corridors requires additional management to ensure safety to people and the 
environment,100 and should be part of an overall and integrated system for maritime 
transportation governance that builds on the foundation developed through the corridors 
system. 
 Canada is currently unprepared for substantial increases in shipping activity.  
Though the risk is more acute outside the corridors, substantial risk remains even within 
the regions designated as the preliminary NMTCs. Information and infrastructure are not 
in place for safe and responsible shipping. Outside of known transit routes, very limited 
portions of the ocean have been mapped to adequate standards. Navigational aids, 
supporting on-shore infrastructure, oil spill response capacity, hazardous waste 																																																								
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management, and ice-breaking capacity decrease rapidly as one moves away from these 
commonly used shipping routes, which have now become the basis for the corridors 
placement.  
 Development of integrated corridors along with a cohesive system for maritime 
transportation governance would address these deficiencies within the designated routes. 
For obvious economic reasons, it would not be possible to extend this level of support to 
the expansive oceanic spaces beyond the corridors. Beyond the importance of ensuring 
appropriate placement of the corridors that considers both cultural and environmental 
implications, perhaps the most important consideration is how the corridors will be 
managed or co-managed in real time among the multiple federal agencies, provincial and 
territorial agencies, and Inuit government in the region. The development and public 
release of the NMTC is clearly just the beginning of an important initiative to ensure safe 
and sustainable shipping in Arctic Canada. An enormous amount of work is still required 
to ensure the placement, implementation, and governance of the corridors is effective and 
to develop trans-national connections to global corridors systems. The NMTC is a 
fundamental foundation for sustainable maritime transportation governance in Canada 
and if developed and managed effectively could become a model for safe and 
environmentally responsible marine governance.   
 
